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CURRENT LEGISLATION
AN ACT TO AMEND THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT IN RELATION TO
DISCRETIONARY POWER OF COURTS TO GRANT RELIEF FROM OBLIGATION TO PAY ACCUMULATED INSTALLMENTS OF ALIMONY.-There

is a prevalent belief that the dissolution of marriage is within the
scope of equity jurisprudence due to the fact that decrees affecting the
status of marriage partake many of the characteristics of equity.
Historically, however, they were never a part of classical equity.
Since marriage was a sacrament, the ecclesiastical courts, rather than

the chancery, concerned itself with such matters in the period prior
to the "Reformation." Today, in England the Probate, Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate on matrimonial disputes,1 but nevertheless a decree for the payment of alimony is considered as an equitable debt
and is enforceable only by equitable execution or by sequestration.2
In New York, however, jurisdiction over matrimonial actions is now
exclusively statutory, and since law and equity have been merged in
this state, it has not been necessary to make a distinction as to the
nature of such decrees except in theory. Where a money judgment
has been entered, of course, there is no need to determine whether the
nature of the action was originally legal or equitable. However,
where alimony has been granted, but has not yet been reduced to a
final judgment, the problem of whether a wife has a vested right
thereto has arisen. If the suit were equitable in nature, there would
be no question of vested rights, since the Chancellor could always
modify his decrees. But because of a failure to clearly analyze this
problem, some New York courts have held that the wife has a vested
right to such accrued alimony. Therefore, the question whether a
court may in its discretion cancel or reduce accrued arrears in alimony when it would be inequitable to enter a money judgment for
all or part of the amount accrued, has resulted in a conflict among
the various departments of the Appellate Division. In order to resolve this conflict, "An Act to amend the Civil Practice Act in relation to discretionary power of courts to grant relief from obligation to pay accumulated installments of alimony," 3 has been adopted
by the New York Legislature on recommendation of the Law Revision Commission. 4 By the act the legislature has sought to make it
clear that a court in its discretion may reduce or cancel the accrued
"Matrimonial Causes

Act of 1857, 20 & 21 VicT. c. 85.
2 16 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 521 (1st ed. 1911).
3 Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 212.
4N. Y. LAW REVISION CoMri ISSION REPORT, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65(E)

(1948).
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installments under a matrimonial decree. The amendment became
effective March 21, 1948.
The following sections were specifically amended by the recent
change:
(1) Section 1170 of the Civil Practice Act and its comparable
sections: 1140, 1140-a, 1155, 1169 and 1170-a.

(2) Section 1171-b of the Civil Practice Act.
Section 1170 now grants discretion to the court, on application
by either party, not only to modify alimony decrees or to insert provisions for alimony if none had been provided for, but it clearly states
that the court may use this discretionary power to cancel or annul
alimony accrued prior to the application, or to become due thereafter.5
In its present form Section 1171-b permits the court, when a
wife seeks to reduce the accrued alimony owed her to a money judgment, to modify or annul the accrued alimony in its discretion. However, once a judgment for such arrears or any part thereof has been
entered then the court no longer has any power to modify. 6
S N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1170 (with amended sections in italics). "Custody and maintenance of children, and support of plaintiff in action for divorce
or separation. Where an action for divorce or separation is brought by either
husband or wife, the court, except as otherwise expressly prescribed by statute,
must give, either in the final judgment, or by one or more orders, made from
time to time before final judgment, such directions as justice requires, between
the parties for the custody, care, education, and maintenance of any of the
children oY the marriage, and where the action is brought by the wife, for the
support of the plaintiff. The court, by order, upon the application of either
party to the action, or any other person or party having the care, custody and
control of said child or children pursuant to said final judgment or order, after
due notice to the other, to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe,
at any time after final judgment, may annul, vary or modify such directions,
or in case no such direction or directions shall have been made, amend it by

inserting such direction or directions as justice requires for the custody, care,
education and maintenance of any such child or children or for the support of
the plaintiff in such final judgment or order or orders. Subject to the provisions of section eleven hundred seventy-one-b the authority granted by this
section shall extend to unpaid sims or installments accrued prior to the application as well as to sums or installments to become due- thereafter.
ON. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT § 1171-b (with amended sections in italics). "Enforcement by execution of judgment or order in action for divorce, separation
or annulment. Where the husband in an action for divorce, separation, annulment, or declaration of nullity of a void marriage, or a person other than the
husband when an action for an annulment is maintained after the death of the

husband, makes default in paying any sum of money as required by the judg-

ment or order directing the payment thereof, the court in its discretion may
make an order directing the entry of judgment for the amount of such arrears,
or for such part thereof as justice requires having regard to the circonstances
of the respective parties, together with ten dollars costs and disbursements.
The application for such order shall be upon such notice to the husband or other
person as the court may direct. Such judgment may be enforced by execution
or in any other manner provided by law for the collection of money judgments.
The relief herein provided for is in addition to any and every other remedy
to which the wife may be entitled under the law; provided that when a judg-
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Previous to the present amendment, Section 1140 dealing with
annulment and Section 1155 dealing with divorce were cloaked in
language similar to that of Section 1170 (divorce and separation)
permitting the court to "amend, vary or modify such directions" for
support. Section 1169, pertaining to divorce, separation and annulment, allowed the court to "make and modify" alimony orders.
Section 1170-a, dealing with support of children when divorce, separation or annulment is denied, granted to the court discretion to
"annul, vary or modify." It will be noted that even prior to the
present changes Section 1170 and its comparable sections permitted
the court to use its discretionary power to annul or modify directions under a matrimonial decree. The confusion, however, arose
because none of these sections clearly stated whether or not this discretionary power was applicable to accrued alimony.
Since the courts of New York have jurisdiction over divorce,
separation and annulment only because they have been authorized by
statute, the power to modify or amend these decrees must be conferred by statute. 7 Therefore, Section 1771 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (now Section 1170 of the Civil Practice Act) was
amended 8 to provide that on application of either party the court did
have the power to modify the matrimonial decree. This section had
the effect of writing into each decree the reservation of power to
modify. But this section was silent as to the power of the court to
modify, or cancel accrued arrears of alimony. Even in 1925 when
Section 1170 9 was amended, no words were used which would clearly
show it was intended to apply to accrued alimony.
As a result of this lack of clarity a split of authority has arisen
among the departments of the Appellate Division. The question was
never decided by the Court of Appeals. The First Department had
held, in Kraus v. Kraus,'0 that where alimony has accrued under the
terms of a decree the wife has a vested right therein, of which she
cannot be deprived by any subsequent action of the courts or legislature. An entirely contrary holding had been laid down by the
Second and Third Departments." In 1946 the Supreme Court of

ment for such arrears or any part thereof shall have been entered pursuant to
this section, such judgment shall thereafter not be subject to modification under
the discretionary power granted by this section; and after the entry of such
judgment the judgment creditor shall not thereafter be entitled to collect by
any form of remedy any greater portion of such arrears than that represented
by the judgment so entered."
7 Livingston v. Livingston, 173' N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123 (1903).
8Laws of N. Y. 1895, c. 891.
9 Laws of N. Y. 1925, c. 240.
10 Krauss v. Krauss, 127 App. Div. 740, 111 N. Y. Supp. 788 (1st Dep't
1908).
31 Cunningham v. Cunningham, 261 App. Div. 973, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 933 (2d
Dep't 1941); Eisinger v. Eisinger, 261 App. Div. 1031, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 22
(3d Dep't 1941).
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the United States had this question before it in Griffin v. Griffin.1 2
In that case a New York court entered a decree of divorce for the
wife in 1924. In 1926 the decree was modified to provide that the
husband should pay the wife alimony. Both parties were then residents of New York and the proceedings were contested. In 1936
the court entered an order declaring that the husband owed the wife
accrued alimony for the period ending October 25, 1935. This proceeding also was contested. In 1938, without notice to the husband,
the wife docketed a judgment against him. The judgment was in
an amount embracing what was due on the 1936 order plus alimony
arrears and interest from October 25, 1935 to the date of the 1938
order. The wife sued in the district court of the District of Columbia
on the 1938 judgment and was awarded the full amount. On appeal
the Supreme Court held that since the wife did not give notice to the
husband, when she made a motion to docket the judgment in 1938,
she could only recover the amount due up to October 25, 1935. The
Court was of the opinion that the husband should have been given
notice because, under Section 1170 of the Civil Practice Act, he can
show cause to have the accrued arrears modified. The Court said,
"We have examined the New York law, and conclude'that the 1926
New York alimony decree was, under the New York practice, subject to some power of modification nunc pro tunc as to alimony accrued but unpaid up to the time of modification. See New York
Civil Practice Act § 1170; Laws 1925, c. 240. Under the local practice, alimony which has accrued under a decree of divorce may not
be collected by execution unless and until a judgment for the amount
of alimony accrued but unpaid is docketed by order of the court
which issued the decree. .

.

. And upon a motion to docket as a

judgment, arrears of alimony awarded under a prior decree, the husband may defend on the grounds that . . . circumstances have so

changed as to justify a reduction of alimony already accrued by modification of the alimony decree." 13
We have now presented the first conflict which the presently
worded sections seek to resolve. That is, Section 1170 and its comparable sections, all of which contain language granting the court
discretion to alter matrimonial decrees requiring the payments of
money, now contain clear language which states that the discretionary
power to modify granted in those sections applies to accrued alimony
as well as to future installments to become due thereafter.
Let us assume, for purposes of illustration, that a wife has been
awarded permanent alimony in a final decree and that her husband
has defaulted in payment of the installments due. What remedies are
327 U. S. 220, 90 L. ed. 635 (1946).
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 226, 90 L. ed. 635, 639 (1946) ; see also
Van Dusen v. Van Dusen, 258 App. Div. 1020, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 96 (3d Dep't
1940); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 261 App. Div. 973, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 933
(2d Dep't 1941) ; Eisinger v. Eisinger, 261 App. Div. 1031, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 22
(3d Dep't 1941).
12
'1
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at the wife's command to enforce the collection of such arrears?
Prior to 1939 she could bring contempt proceedings, sequester his
property or reduce the accrued alimony to a judgment and levy execution under Section 504 of the Civil Practice Act. However, the
Court of Appeals has held that the latter remedy could not be utilized
for temporary alimony.' 4 The reason for the distinction was said to
be that the statutes which authorize temporary alimony 15 and the
means for its enforcement 16 rested exclusively on statutory provisions which were not to be extended by implication. 17 Since the statute which created the right also made provision for relief by sequestration and contempt, these two were deemed the only remedies by
which it was enforceable. Furthermore, if the wife sought to collect
accrued temporary alimony she was compelled to utilize these remedies before the final decree was entered. This resulted from a holding
by the Court of Appeals that all proceedings to compel the payment
of temporary accrued alimony were limited to the action in which
the order for alimony had been granted.' 8 To alleviate this situation
and to afford the wife an extra remedy, the legislature in 1939 adopted
Section 1171-b, Civil Practice Act. 19 As a result of this legislation,
a wife who is owed alimony, counsel fees, and other similar sums
which the court has ordered or decreed in matrimonial litigation may
now:
(1) make a motion under Section 1172, Civil Practice Act, to
hold the husband in contempt of court. However, one should note
that under Section 1172-a the court, in its discretion, may relieve him
temporarily from contempt if he is financially unable to pay in part
or in whole;
(2) make a motion under Section 1171, Civil Practice Act, to
sequester the husband's property and the court may order that from
the proceeds such sums shall be paid as justice requires. Again, one
should observe that this remedy may be withheld in the court's
discretion;
(3) make a motion under Section 1171-b, Civil Practice Act, to
enter a money judgment which is collectible by execution or any other
appropriate process that the law provides. Although the latter section was created for the purpose of enabling the wife to collect temit
porary accrued alimony after the final decree had been entered, 20
was drawn broadly enough to include permanent alimony as well.
14 Doncourt v. Doncourt, 245 App. Div. 91, 281 N. Y. Supp. 535 (1st Dep't
1935), aff'd without opinion, 275 N. Y. 470, 11 N. E. 2d 302 (1937).
15 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1169.
Ir N. Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT §§ 1171, 1172.
17 Beadleston v. Beadleston, 103 N. Y. 402, 8 N. E. 735 (1886).
IsMatter of Thrall, 12 App. Div. 235, 42 N. Y. Supp. 439 (1896), aff'd,
153 N. Y. 644, 47 N. E. 1111 (1897).
19 Laws of N. Y. 1939, c. 431.
20 The language of Section 1171-b permits entry of judgment for "any sum
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It is under the third remedy that a second conflict has arisen.
Has a court, on application for an order directing entry of judgment
under Section 1171-b for alimony that has accrued, any discretionary
power to withhold judgment or grant it only in reduced amount
where circumstances make complete collection inequitable? The
Second, Third and Fourth Departments hold that granting of a judgment is discretionary. 21 The First Department, however, in TreherneThomas v. Treherne-Thomas 22 has declared that accrued alimony
under a final decree creates vested rights which that court is powerless to nullify. Therefore, a judgment "must" be entered, in the
absence of such positive defense as payment, for the full amount.
Since the other two remedies for the collection of temporary
accrued alimony (contempt and sequestration) are discretionary, it
would seem, unless an intent to the contrary was expressed by the
legislature, that the new remedy under 1171-b should also be discretionary. No such intent is expressed and nothing in the history
of the section indicates that the legislature's use of such language as
"the court may make an order directing the entry of judgment" was
ever intended to be construed as "must make an order." 23 Nevertheless a sharp difference has arisen in those decisions construing the
section.
As currently amended, the legislature has sought to resolve this
conflict by inserting into Section 1171-b the words "in its discretion"
before the word "may." Therefore, on an application by either
party, for a money judgment under Section 1171-b, after having
given such notice as the court shall prescribe, the court has been given
discretion to extinguish part or all of the accrued alimony when the
circumstances of the case make it equitable to do so.
As a result of the various interpretations of Sections 1170 and
1171-b of the Civil Practice Act prior to the current amendment,
courts of other jurisdictions have been beset with difficulties whenever they have attempted to enforce a New York decree involving
the controverted sections. Under the full faith and credit clause of
the Constitution of the United States, a sum which is fixed and owing
under a New York judgment, may be the basis of an action in an-

of money . . . ." Thus it is broad enough to cover alimony proper as well as
counsel fees and expenses. It should also be noted that applying the section
to permanent alimony merely restates an existing power to enter a money judgment on accrued arrears under Section 504 of the Civil Practice Act.
21 McCanliss v. McCanliss, 268 App. Div. 138, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 289 (2d
Dep't 1946); Eisinger v. Eisinger, 261 App. Div. 1031, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 22
(3d Dep't 1941); Gehring v. Gehring, 262 App. Div. 1065, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 257
(4th Dep't 1941).
22267 App. Div. 509, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 679 (1st Dep't 1944).
23 It would appear that such a construction is not unnatural or strained.
Consequently, since the legislature drew the remedial statute broad enough to
include accrued permanent alimony as well as temporary it would seem that
the discretionary power was applicable to the former also.
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other state.2 4 However, courts in other states and the federal courts
have found it very difficult to enforce alimony decrees for they were
not certain as to whether the statutes of New York permitted reduction of accruals or whether the amount due was a fixed sum. As a
consequence, other jurisdictions enforced the accumulated installments
or refused to do so depending on what they believed to be the New
York law.
The following illustration will elucidate this point in the conflict
of laws. In Sistare v. Sistare2 5 a wife brought an action in Connecticut to recover a judgment against her husband for arrears of
alimony under a New York separation decree. The Connecticut tribunal denied recovery for it was of the opinion that under the law
of New York the accrued installments remained subject to the court's
discretion and could be modified or cancelled. Upon an appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States it was there decided that
the accruals were not subject to reduction. 26 However, the Supreme
Court took an opposite stand in Griffin v. Griffin.2 7 In that case, as
indicated above, the court construed Section 1170 to mean that arrears
of alimony were subject to changes.
The uncertainty which has confronted the courts of other states
is sought to be remedied by the provision now contained in Section
1171-b. It is to be noted, however, that whereas the section now
permits a court to annul or modify accrued alimony, when the wife
once makes a motion to reduce it to a judgment, such judgment, if
duly entered, is no longer subject to any further discretionary
modifications.
It is noteworthy that the amendments to the various sections
create retrospective legislation. In view of the constitutional questions raised by retrospective legislation we will discuss the effect of
the amendments on accrued alimony prior to the date the present
amended sections went into effect. As a rule of statutory construction the provisions of a statute will not be applied retroactively unless the intent of the legislature clearly requires such interpretation.2 8
Neither Section 1170 and its comparable sections nor Section 1171-b
had clearly expressed the intent of the legislature that they should
apply retrospectively. These sections, prior to the present amendments, did not even contain clear language to show that they might
be applied retroactively in respect to decrees rendered after their
effective dates. But as the sections stand today, the legislative intent
to apply retrospectively is clearly expressed. This, of course, means
that decrees rendered after the effective date of the present sections
CoNFLIcT OF LAWS § 464 (1934).
25218 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 905 (1910).
26 The decision was based on the theory that Section 1771, Civil Practice
Act (now Section 1170 of the Civil Practice Act), did not grant discretion to
the court to annul or modify accrued alimony.
27327 U. S. 220, 90 L. ed. 635 (1946).
28 Walker v. Walker, 155 N. Y. 77, 49 N. E. 663 (1898).
24 RESTATEMENT,
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are subject to retrospective modification. But does that mean that
decrees prior to the effective date may be modified? In Livingston
v. Livingston 29 our highest state court held that even though a legislature does expressly declare its intent that the act should apply
retrospectively, it would not be effective as to decrees entered prior
to the date it went into effect.
In Waddey v..Waddey, 30 a wife, in 1925, was granted a divorce
decree and awarded alimony. Thereafter she led an immoral life.
In 1938 Section 1172-c, Civil Practice Act, was passed which permitted a court, on application by the husband, to cancel the alimony
awarded upon proof that the wife was leading an unchaste existence
and was holding herself out as the wife of another. When the husband sought to avail himself of this statute, the Court of Appeals, in
reversing a judgment for the husband, held that the statute would not
affect decrees entered prior to the effective date of the statute. The
husband there contended that even without the 1938 statute he is
entitled to relief, in the discretion of the court, under Section 1170.
It will be remembered that the adoption of Section 1170 had the effect
of writing into each decree a reservation of power to modify; and
since that section was passed prior to the date of entry of the final
decree in question the husband was of the opinion that Section 1170
should govern. But the court, after holding Section 1170 inapplicable,3 1 by way of dictum, traced the history of the section. It stated
that its provisions, in respect to modifying or annulling directions,
have been in effect since 1895 either in the Code of Civil Procedure
or the Civil Practice Act. Where claims had been made that these
provisions were retroactive it was held that it had no effect prior to
its effective date.
It would seem, therefore, that Sections 1170 and 1171-b will
not affect decrees prior to their effective dates. As a result of these
recent amendments, the husband may now make a motion to cancel
the accrued arrears under Section 1170 and its comparable sections
and to reduce the amount of each installment he may have to pay in
the future. It will not avail the wife to contend that she has a vested
right, for the legislature has now clearly resolved this question, thus
indicating that, in effect, matrimonial actions are to be considered as
basically equitable in nature. Under Section 1171-b a court, in its
discretion, may expunge or reduce accumulated arrears when it would
be inequitable to enter a money judgment for all or part of the amount
accumulated. However, once a money judgment has been entered the
judgment shall thereafter not be subject to modification under the
discretionary power granted by Section 1171-b. New York has now
29

173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123 (1903).
Y. 251, 49 N. E. 2d 8 (1943).

30290 N.
31 It was

held inapplicable because Section 1170 was not passed to authorize
a court to annul provisions of alimony for the misconduct of the wife by an

immoral course of living.
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created a workable rule which will enable the courts of other jurisdictions to enforce the judgment without the necessity of interpreting
for itself the law of New York on this subject.
MORRIS SILVERMAN.
AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT RELATING TO COUNTERCLAIMS IN MATRIMONIAL ACTION.-In March, 1948, the legis-

lature of New York enacted a bill 1 repealing Section 1168 of the
Civil Practice Act 2 which read as follows:
COUNTERCLAIM

IN

MATRIMONIAL

ACTION.

Where an action

for divorce, separation or annulment is brought by either husband or wife, a cause of action for divorce, separation or annulment against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant may be
interposed in connection with a denial of the material allegations
of the complaint, as a counterclaim.
The repeal of this section was recommended by the Judicial Council
of the State of New York in furtherance of the Council's general
policy to foster legislation which will effect the determination of as
many controversies as possible in one action thus avoiding multiplicity of suits. 3 Section 266, Civil Practice Act, as amended in 1936,
which defines counterclaims generally, is broad enough in terms to
include the counterclaims referred to in Section 1168. However, the
courts have construed Section 1168 to be a limitation on Section 266,
as shall appear later, and as a result, counterclaims have been
denied which should have been allowed.
Since under Section 266, as it originally stood, only such counterclaims were permissible as tended to defeat or diminish plaintiff's
recovery, 4 it was necessary to enact Section 1168 which in its original form permitted counterclaims for divorce or separation in divorce
or separation actions, so that a matrimonial counterclaim of a nature
different from that in the complaint could properly be interposed. In
1936, in recognition of the general desirability of avoiding multiplicity of suits, the legislature repealed the old Section 266 and added
the present section: 5
COUNTERCLAIM DEFINED.
A counterclaim may be any cause of
action in favor of the defendants or some of them against the
plaintiffs or some of them, a person whom a plaintiff represents
or a plaintiff and another person or persons alleged to be liable.
'Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 282.
2 Laws of N. Y. 1937, c. 525.
3 N. Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, LEGIs. Doc. No. 13, p. 20 (1946) ; N. Y.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, LEGIS. Doc. No. 2, p. 15 (1936); N. Y. JUDICIAL
COUNCIL REPORT, L-cis. Doc. No. 1, pp. 1, 44 (1935).
4 N. Y. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 501; Zawadsky v. Zawadsky, 169 Misc.
404, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
5 Laws of N. Y. 1936, c. 324.

